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预算松弛的影响因素与经济后果——来自我国上市公司的经验证据 被引量:111

The Influence Factors and Economic Consequence of Budget Slack:Evidence from Listed Enterprises in China
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摘要 现有的众多经验研究证明,组织中的预算松弛是十分普遍的,而代理理论与权变理论是有效解释预算松弛的重要理论。文章选择我国上市公司2001~2004年的预算数据,研究上市公司预算松弛的影响因素及其对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:1.股权性质、股权结构和企业规模是解释预算松弛的重要变量;2.一个严紧的预算目标有助于提高企业的ROA和ROE,但并未提高企业的主业盈利能力。 Many empirical researches indicate that budget slack is prevalent in organizations. There are two important theories for explaining budget slack: agency theory and contingency theory. We select budgetary data from the companies listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen to research on budget slack. Empirical results illuminate: 1. Ownership property, ownership structure and firm size are important explanatory variables for budget slack. 2. Tight budget does not have effective incentive effect, but improve manager's motivation to manage earnings.
作者 潘飞 程明
出处 《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第6期55-66,共12页 Journal of Finance and Economics
基金 国家哲学社会科学基金资助项目(06BJY060) 教育部人文社会科学研究基地重点研究资助项目(05JJD630002) 上海财经大学"十.一五规划 211工程建设"资助项目
关键词 预算松弛 代理理论 权变理论 政府干预 企业业绩 budget slack agency theory contingency theory government influence firm performance
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参考文献19

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