政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资

Government Control,Executive Compensation and Capital Investment

本文在代理理论框架下,基于中国国有企业薪酬管制的制度背景,就经理薪酬对投资过度和投资不足的影响进行了理论分析,并以我国上市公司2000—2004年的数据为样本,实证检验了经理薪酬在企业资本投资决策方面的治理效应。结果发现,当薪酬契约无法对经理的工作努力和经营才能作出补偿和激励时,有更多的证据表明,地方政府控制的上市公司存在着因薪酬契约失效导致的投资过度现象。上述研究发现,对理解中国国有企业经理薪酬管制的经济后果具有重要意义,也为当前关于国有企业产权改革和薪酬改革的争论提供了一个有益的视角。

Based on agency theory of the firm, and the special institutional settings that there exists the regulation on executive compensation in Chinese SOEs, this paper analyses the impact of executive compensation on over-investment and under- investment. Subsequently, Using the data on China＇ s listed companies data from 2000 to 2004, we investigate governance effect of executive compensation on capital investment decision. We find that, on the condition of executive diligence and talent not being compensated, there are more evidence shows that government control especially SOELG control and SAMB control has induced over-investment.