特许经营权竞标理论的演进及新进展:一个理论综述

Evolution and New Orientation of Franchise Bidding Theory

特许经营权竞标是政府为了提高自然垄断行业的供给效率而引入的机制。在竞标企业众多,没有不确定性、沉没成本和共谋等条件下,特许经营权竞标能够筛选出效率最高的企业。由于存在竞标合同不完备、资产专用性、市场不确定和政企合谋风险等影响因素,特许经营权竞标常常不能达到预期效果。合约理论、拍卖理论、委托-代理理论等研究成果和各国实践推动了特许经营权竞标理论发展。国内对特许经营权竞标理论的研究主要是整理和介绍现有理论,并结合中国制度特点进行分析,仍需要在现有基础上不断完善。

Franchise bidding is a mechanism introduced by the government to improve the supply efficiency of natural monopolistic industries. Franchise bidding can find out enterprises with higher efficiency under many conditions, such as great numbers of bidding enterprises, no uncer- tainty, sunk costs and conspiracy. However, franchise bidding cannot usually achieve prospective effects because of some influential elements including the imperfection of bidding contracts, assets specificity, market instability and conspiracy of government and enterprises. Many theories and practice in many countries have pushed the development of franchise theory. Many researches in China concentrate on the review and the introduction of existed theories on franchise. The author believes that the theory needs to be improved based on the characteriistics of Chinese systems.