大股东控制、股权制衡与公司绩效

Large Shareholders Controlling,Outside Block-holders and Firm Performance

在La Porta等的研究模型基础上引入股权制衡等因素,在最终所有权框架下探讨大股东控制和股权制衡对公司绩效的影响。研究结果表明,公司绩效与最终控制股东现金流权正相关,与控制权和现金流权的分离程度负相关,股权制衡的作用并不是简单地存在或不存在,而是取决于控制股东的最终所有权状态。在控制权和现金流权分离程度较高的公司中,股权制衡对大股东剥削行为的约束作用显著;但在控制权和现金流权分离程度较低的公司中,股权制衡可能因为导致大股东之间讨价还价而带来精力耗散,表现出更差的公司绩效。此外,股权制衡作用在相对控股、政府控制和低竞争行业公司中最为显著。

The paper investigates the ultimate ownership and outside block-holders, and their effect on firm performance, Empirical results show that there exist significant cash flow right incentive effect, and entrenchment effect when cash flow right is separated form control right（SR） ; the effect of outside block-holders relies on the ultimate ownership, Among comparatively controlling firms, government-controlled firms and low competitive industries firms, the effect of outside block-holders is most important.