基于过度自信的股权激励模型

The Stock Option Incentive Models on the Basis of Overconfidence

股权激励是众多上市企业建立激励制度的首选模式。传统的股权激励模型依据传统的委托代理模型而来,没有充分考虑到现实中委托人和代理人的某些非理性行为和心理因素对模型的影响,导致激励效率低下。过度自信是人们的一种经常性的心理表现,过度自信对委托代理关系的影响等研究已成为目前的热点。本文研究了信息对称和不对称情形下基于过度自信的股权激励合同的设计,通过数理推导分析了过度自信对股权激励合同设计的影响机制,包括对激励系数、努力水平、固定报酬、代理成本、委托人次优期望效用的影响,并对代理人风险中性做了扩展研究,研究结论对设计股权激励契约、提高激励效率、雇佣代理人等方面有重要应用价值。最后,文章指出了对过度自信进一步研究的方向。

Stock option incentive is the first selection of many public companies when they establish incentive system. Traditional stock option incentive model stems from Traditional principal-agent model. The influence of irrational behaviors and psychological factors to stock option incentive model are not considered sufficiently, which leads to inefficient incentive. Overconfidence is a universal psychology. The influences to principal-agent relationship of overconfidence are highlights at present. Stock option incentive design on the basis of overconfidence on the condition of information symmetry and information asymmetry is discussed in this paper. The influences of overconfidence to stock option contract design including incentive coefficient, effort level, fixed compensation, agency cost and second-best expected utility of the principal are analyzed with mathematical induction. Besides, extended research of risk-neutral agent is studied. The results show great applied value on designing stock option incentive, improving incentive efficiency and hiring agents. At last, the direction of the further research on overconfidence is pointed out.