特许权价值、隐性保险与风险承担--中国银行业的经验分析

Charter Value,Implicit Deposit Insurance and Risk-taking:evidence from Chinese Banking Sector

本文以特许权价值与风险承担为主要研究视角,运用面板数据模型,分析隐性存款保险制度下我国特许权价值经济效应的有效性。研究结果表明,隐性保险降低了特许权价值对银行风险承担行为的敏感性,特许权价值的自律机制不仅对国有银行几乎失效,而且对非国有银行的风险约束效应也不显著。如此说明当前中国商业银行受到隐性存款保险制度的全面保护,从而弱化了开展全面风险管理的激励机制。

This study offers an econometric test for the validity of bank charter value in risk controlling under the implicit deposit insurance in China with a panel data of 14 commercial banks from 1994 -2003, chiefly from the perspective of charter value and risk taking. The results show that the effect of charter value on restraining banks from aggressive risk has been weakened greatly as a result of the protection from official insurance. The investigations on non-state owned banks confirm that the restrictions of charter value on bank＇s risk-taking behaviors hardly exist. These results make it clear that the official implicit insurance almost covers the whole banking sector in China and the self-discipline mechanism of charter value cannot be fully achieved.