摘要
中国于1993年引入孟加拉国乡村银行(Grameen Bank)的小额信贷模式,并得到政府的重视。该模式实际上将农户置于一个特定的还款机制中。本文将运用博弈论分析影响农户还款积极性的关键因素,并且结合中国小额信贷业务的实际情况,抓住邮储银行正式获准开业这一契机,研究如何根据理论的结果在实际操作中提高农户的还款率,解决目前联保制度在运作中的一些问题,并给出邮储银行在发展农村小额信贷业务时成功运作联保制度的相关建议。
The micro -credit model of Bangladesh Grameen Bank (Grameen Bank) was introduced into China in 1993, and attracted the Chinese Government' attention. This model provides farmers a specific repayment mechanism. In this paper the key elements that influence repayment are analyzed by game theory. Combined with the actual context of China's micro -credit services, the paper aims to apply the theoretical results in improving the repayment rate in practice, in the case when the Postal Savings Bank of China is formally authorized to operate. Finally, recommen dations for to the Postal Savings Bank of China for the development of rural micro -credit system are proposed.
出处
《北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版)》
2008年第2期46-51,共6页
Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
农户联保
还款博弈
邮储银行
rural micro - credit system
game of repayment
Postal Savings Bank of China