基于监督和控制的IT外包关系管理的激励模型

An Incentive Model of IT Outsourcing Based on Monitoring and Controlling

在IT外包活动中,由于发包方和接包方之间存在信息不对称,且发包方通常又是信息弱势的一方,因此,如何设计一种有效的激励机制来引导接包方的行为是一个值得研究的问题。为此,本文提出了一个基于监督和控制的IT外包关系管理的委托-代理模型,该模型通过调节监督和控制费用的比例来激发接包方达到最佳的努力水平,从而使发包方在满足接包方保留效用的前提下获得更高的期望收益。

During the process of IT outsourcing, the information between the firm and the vendor is usually asymmetrical, and the firm is inferior in information aspect, therefore it is important to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism for restricting the activities of the vendor. In order to solve such a problem, a principle - agent model based on monitoring and controlling is proposed in this paper. This model can motivate the vendor to reach the optimal level of effort and brings firm higher expected profit by adjusting the ratio of supervising and controlling costs.