摘要
金融市场开放和改革使我国中小银行得到了较快发展,但也逐步陷入了风险扩张而绩效下滑的困境中。运用基于Stackelberg模型构建的寡头垄断市场银行风险竞争模型来对中小银行发展困境进行的实证研究发现,在资金价格(存贷款利率)受到严格管制的垄断市场中,银行间的竞争将会导致银行体系风险水平与资产规模的不断扩张,而不是经营绩效的持续提升。要使中小银行摆脱发展困境并得到健康发展,必须在培育银行业专业化分工的同时逐渐打破银行体系的垄断格局,推进利率市场化,放开对资金价格的严格限制,使中小银行的非价格竞争劣势转变为价格竞争优势;同时加强对中小银行的监管,为其营造一个公平竞争的市场环境。
Small and medium banks have boomed after the opening and reform of financial market in China, and meanwhile they have gradually stepped into developmental dilemma. Based on Stackelberg dynamic game model, this paper develops a model of risk-based oligopoly competition and applies it to the analysis of the developmental dilemma of small and medium banks. The research findings show that the risk-based competition among small and medium banks in oligopoly market with interest rate limited will cause risk boosting and assets expansion rather than performance improvement of banking system. The policy implication of these conclusions is that to ensure the healthy development of the small and medium banks it is necessary to foster market specialization while gradually breaking the monopoly, to implement interest marketization, to loosen price control and to transform the disadvantage of the non-price completion to the advantage of price competition. It is also important to create a favorable environment for fair completion while tightening the supervision over the small and medium banks.
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第12期59-65,共7页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
广东省哲学社科基金研究项目“开放条件下的金融安全与金融监管体制研究”(07E04)
教育部留学回国人员启动基金项目
关键词
寡头垄断
风险竞争
中小银行
发展困境
Oligopoly
Risk-based Competition
Small Medium Banks
Developmental Dilemma