摘要
国外对联盟诚信的研究主要以诚实、承诺和可信性为主题,但理论界并未对其内涵达成共识;大部分博弈分析只简单给出不同诚信策略组合下联盟企业的收益而没有就诚信水平对联盟稳定性的作用机制进行深入研究;而"重复博弈"掩盖了诚信的"积累效应",对收益的简单贴现计算不符合联盟获取和分配收益的实际。本文将联盟诚信界定为维持合作的生产要素,并以预期合作周期作为博弈分析单元,探讨了短期合作中,惩罚力度、对未来收益的预期、联盟的均衡性和预期合作周期数对联盟诚信选择的作用机制,得到了在不诚信的机会收益较高、较低和未知的情况下,分别通过提高惩罚力度、实际诚信水平和收益预期而保持联盟稳定性的条件。
Research abroad always took honesty,commitment and trustworthiness as the main themes of creditability of strategic alliance,but the general connotation of it hasn't yet been widely accepted.Most game analysis only briefly presented the benefits under different creditability strategy combinations,but did not focus on the exploration of the effect mechanism of creditability to the stability of alliance,and repeated game analysis concealed the accumulation effect of creditability,the simple discount calculation of the benefits fell short of practice of gaining and distributing the proceeds.Defining credibility of alliance as a production factor for maintaining cooperation,and taking anticipative cooperation cycle as game analysis unit,the paper probed into the effect mechanism of the factors,such as punishment for cheat,anticipation of the future income,strength of enterprises,number of anticipative cooperation cycle,to the choice of credibility level during the short-run cooperation.And then the conditions such as enhancing punishment,elevating actual credibility level and boosting anticipation of the future income had been put forward to preserve stability of alliance under the states of high opportunity revenue of incredibility,low opportunity revenue of incredibility and unbeknown opportunity revenue of incredibility respectively.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期47-52,58,共7页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571061
70531030
7012001)
关键词
企业战略联盟
诚信
预期合作周期
博弈
稳定性
strategic alliance
creditability
anticipative cooperation cycle
game
stability