摘要
为研究中小企业安全生产管制路径演化规律,借助演化经济学方法,建立了中小企业与安全生产管制代理之间的支付矩阵。通过交往过程的演化模型分析,揭示了个体之间的策略选择对群体行为的影响。用数值仿真演示了决策参数的不同取值和初始条件的改变对演化结果的影响。研究发现:中小企业安全生产管制路径演化系统收敛于两种模式,一种为理想状态,一种为不良"锁定"状态;通过调节参数可以跳出不良"锁定"状态,优化管制路径;基于演化经济学视角设计中小企业安全生产管制制度,有利于提高管制的效果,诱导微观个体朝着期望的方向演化。
To find out the evolution principle of control SME production safety,this article constructed a payment matrix between SME and production safety control agency by the methods of evolutionary economics.Authors disclosed the effect of individuals' choice of policy on group behavior based on analyzing evolution model of interacting process.This paper showed the influence of diversity of decision-making parameters and variation of initial condition on evolution result through reliable numerical simulation.This research found that the evolution of SME' production safety control system converges in two patterns: an ideal status and a "locked" status.Through adjusting parameters,the system may jump out of the "locked" status and the supervision of route can be optimized.Results implied that SME' production safety control system based on evolutionary economics facilitates to improve the effect of control and guide the microcosmic individual evolving to the expectative direction.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第2期160-168,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571034)
国家社科基金项目(07CJY014)
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20060400918)
江苏省博士后科研资助计划项目(0601020C)
江苏大学校高级人才基金(06JDG025)
江苏大学人文基金项目(JDR2008B01)
关键词
安全生产
管制
演化博弈
中小企业
production safety
supervise
evolutionary game
SME