R&D补贴对中国企业自主创新的激励效应

The Stimulating Effects of R&D Subsidies on Independent Innovation of Chinese Enterprises

中国作为技术追赶型国家,政府惯常将R&D补贴作为激励企业进行自主创新的关键政策手段,但事实是企业经常发送虚假的"创新类型"信号以获取政府R&D补贴。本文建立了一个企业与R&D补贴政策制定者之间的动态不对称信息博弈模型,力图刻画企业获取R&D补贴的策略性行为及R&D补贴的激励效应。研究表明当两者之间存在信息不对称,且用于原始创新的专用性人力资本价格过于低廉时,原始创新补贴将产生"逆向"激励作用。面对企业释放的虚假信号和高昂的甄别成本,政策制定者的最优补贴方案是通过提高原始创新的专用性人力资本价格从而形成分离均衡。文章的结论为甄别企业的真实创新类型提供了可信的方法,同时给出了提高政府R&D补贴效率可行的政策建议。

In those catching-up countries, exemplified by China, who are running after developed countries in terms of technology, governments always consider R＆D subsidies as a critical measure to stimulate enterprises to carry out independent innovation. However, enterprises in reality often send out false innovation type signals so as to attain government subsidy. This paper builds up a dynamic and asymmetric information game model between enterprises and policy makers, with an attempt to depict enterprises＇ strategies to acquire R＆D subsidy and to analyze the subsidy＇s stimulation effect. It indicates that the primary innovation subsidy would exert a ＂negative＂ stimulating effect if enterprises and government share asymmetric information, and meanwhile the special human capital for primary innovation is excessively cheap. Faced with the problems of false signals sent by enterprises, as well as the exorbitant distinguish cost, the best subsidies scheme for government is to achieve the separating equilibrium through increasing the special human capital price. The conclusion provides predictable methods to distinguish enterprises＇ real innovation types, and feasible policy suggestion to enhance government R＆D subsidies efficieney.