摘要
政策性农业保险补贴具有动态性和多维性的最优边界,补贴的不足和过高均会减少福利。本文将消费者剩余和外部性结合起来构建了农业保险的福利经济学模型,探讨了最优补贴边界的决定标准;从保户和保险机构两方面分析了直接补贴原保险相对低效率的原因所在,提出了涵盖运作主体、基金运作方式、费率和再保险责任限制方式等要素的以再保险补贴为核心的最优补贴方式的构想。相对于直接补贴原保险的做法,这种构想更有利于实现农业风险的分散,减少信息不对称,提高转移支付的效率,进而实现农业保险供给的扩张。
Subsidy to policy agricultural insurance has a dynamic nature and a multi-dimension optimal border. Too high or too low subsidy can reduce the level of welfare benefits. The paper integrated the theory of consumer surplus and its nature of externality to construct a welfare economics model for policy agricultural insurance. It elab- orated on the criteria for deciding the optimal border of subsidy. It also explained the reasons for relative low effi- ciency of direct subsidy from both the angle of policyholders and insurance institutions. It put forth the thinking of an optimal subsidy method with reinsurance subsidy at the core. This concept involved factors such as all relevant entities, insurance funds operation, premium rate and restriction on reinsurer's liabilities, etc. In contrast to direct subsidy to primary insurance plans, this method was more conducive for spreading agricultural risks, reducing infor- mation asymmetry, improving the efficiency of transfer payment, and ultimately, achieving an expansion of agricul- tural insurance supply.
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期96-101,共6页
Insurance Studies
关键词
农业保险
补贴
最优边界
补贴方式
agricultural insurance
subsidy
optimal border
subsidizing method