商业机密约束下的最优专利设计

Optimal Patent Design in Presence of Trade Secret

本文假设创新知识具有"隐含性"和"生产性",将商业机密作为保障创新成果可占有性的一种替代方式引入最优专利设计分析。专利制度在本质上可以看作政府向潜在创新者提供的机密交换契约,具有克服公共品效应和鼓励信息披露的双重功能。分析表明,专利制度的建立必然提高社会总福利,而最优总保护度由创新知识的平均生产性所决定,并随之递减。

This paper analyzes optimal patent design in presence of trade secret under the assumption that innovation knowledge per se is tacit and productive. Patent system has twofold functions, not only encouraging public disclosure of private technology knowledge, but mitigating public good effect as well. Optimal patent protection is positive and decreases in the average productiveness of technological knowledge.