进入权、声誉与服务外包组织治理——一个非对称信息的不完全契约模型

Access Right,Reputation and Governance of Service Outsourcing

服务外包作为一种介于市场和企业之间的中间组织形态,在人力资本密集型的服务交易治理中有其独到的优势。本文基于"进入权"和"声誉"两种治理机制,从静态和动态两个层面为服务外包组织治理搭建了一个框架模型。在静态模型中,通过对市场、外包和企业三种组织的比较制度分析得出,虽然三种组织形式都不可能达到社会最优的专用性人力资本投资激励水平,但基于进入权治理的服务外包组织可以得到次优的激励效果。在动态模型中,通过引入不对称信息和声誉机制,证明了在长期合作条件下,服务外包组织可获得社会最优的专用性人力资本投资激励水平。

As a new form of hybrid organization between market and enterprises,service outsourcing takes unique advantages in human-capital-intensive service transaction. Based on governance mechanism of access and reputation,a model on organization governance of service outsourcing is established from static and dynamic view. In the static model,in the light of comparative institutional analysis on market,outsourcing and firm,we conclude that the service outsourcing organization exploiting governance of right of access could get the suboptimal incentive effect,although these three organizations couldn't get the social-best specific human capital investment. In the dynamic model,we prove that the service outsourcing organization could achieve social-best specific human capital investment in the long term with the effect of asymmetric information and reputation.