BAMs的均衡报价性质及其对合谋的激励

Equilibrium Bidding Behaviors and Collusion Incentives in BAMs

近年来报价平均方法(BAMs)在我国建筑业招投标中得到广泛应用,本文研究了报价平均方法的均衡报价行为及其对竞争者之间合谋的激励。本文证明报价平均方法会使竞标企业有激励互相抬高价格,报价脱离成本,造成市场资源配置无效率,促进企业合谋等更严重的问题。报价平均方法并非解决最低价中标制度产生的"过度压价"或"赢家诅咒"问题的好办法。

This paper investigates the Bid-Averaging Methods（BAMs） which are widely applied in procurement auctions in construction industry of China. It focuses on the equilibrium behaviors of bidders, and the incentives to collude. In China, the ＂winner＇s curse＂ problem is severe in First-price sealed bid auctions when low-bid auction was introduced to procurement processes. BAMs was introduced to alleviate price competition and ＂winner＇s curse＂. The paper proves bidders have incentive to raise bids in BAMs. Bids in BAMs may be far from true costs of bidders and the average bids have weak relationship with the average costs. The BAMs are inefficient in allocating the procurement contracts and lead more collusions or bid-rings.