中国犯罪治理的财政支出偏向：选择“大棒”还是“胡萝卜”？

The Battle Against Crime in Transitional China:The Choice between Sticks and Carrots

中国的犯罪治理政策一直奉行的是严厉打击的"大棒"政策,而忽视提高社会福利条件的"胡萝卜"政策,但近年来犯罪率的持续上升促使我们去反思和重审现有公共政策的有效性。本文通过一个扩展的时间配置模型发现,在风险规避的假定条件下,如果政府支出是有效率的,政府无论是增加惩罚犯罪的资源投入量还是增加提高社会福利条件的资源投入量都能够减少个体决策者从事"非法"活动的时间。但是,基于中国2000—2006年间30个省级数据的检验结果,只支持了社会福利支出的犯罪治理效应,而公检法司支出则不具有预期的犯罪威慑效应。研究结论意味着从财政资源配置的角度而言,中国现阶段选择"胡萝卜"偏向的财政政策,是比"大棒"偏向的财政政策具有更低社会成本和更高社会收益的犯罪治理策略;同时,提高公检法司支出效率也应是当前犯罪治理政策中的一项基础性工作。

In the past, the sticks were the mainly policies to battle against crime, and carrots were ignored in China. But the constantly increasing of crime rate awake us to meditate the effects of sticks and carrots on crime. This paper investigates the effect of sticks and carrots on crime. Sticks are measured by per judicial budget and carrots are measured by per welfare budget. We find that there is little effect of per judicial budget on crime, at the same time, per welfare budget performs more effective, and it is steadily improving. And it means that the carrots are more effective than sticks on battle against crime at present in China.