期刊文献+

基于多任务委托代理的第三方物流激励与监督机制 被引量:7

Incentive and Monitoring Mechanism in the Third Party Logistics with the Multitask Principal-agent Model
下载PDF
导出
摘要 非对称信息环境下的物流外包活动中,物流外包方与物流服务提供商之间的关系实际为一种多任务委托代理关系。为同时实现激励和监督两种物流服务提供商道德风险的防范机制,通过建立多元剩余利益分享模型,引入物流服务提供商努力减低物流成本的返还率和提高物流服务质量的索取率,并对模型中相关影响因素做出拓展分析,提出了防范道德风险的控制策略与建议。 The relationship between the logistics demanders and logistics services provider is the multitask principle - agent system in the logistics outsourcing with asymmetric information. In order to avoid moral hazard of logistics services provider,as the incentive and guideline mechanism,the multiple share - saving model is proposed,including both the return rate for endeavor to reduce logistics costs and the bonus rate for improving quality of logistics services. And the relative influence factors are researched profoundly,in the third party logistics management,some meaningful strategies and advice are put forwards.
出处 《商业研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第7期185-188,共4页 Commercial Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目 项目编号:70940008 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金 项目编号:2009QN085 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目 项目编号:200801510001 教育部科学技术研究重点项目 项目编号:209030
关键词 道德风险 多任务委托代理 激励机制 监督机制 第三方物流 moral hazard multitask principal - agent incentive mechanism monitoring mechanism the third party logistics
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

二级参考文献26

  • 1杨浩雄,刘仲英.整车物流中委托代理问题的研究[J].工业工程与管理,2004,9(6):58-60. 被引量:9
  • 2Wei Shi Lim. A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third-party logistics providers[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2002,125:519-525.
  • 3Fama E. Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88: 288- 307.
  • 4van Hock R I. The contribution of performance measurement to the expansion of third party logistics alliances in the supply chain[J]. International Journal of Operations & Production, 2001.
  • 5Radner R. Monitoring cooperative agreement in a repeated principal-agent relationship[J]. Eeonometrica, 1981,49:1127-1148.
  • 6Hart O, Holmstrom B. The theory of contracts [C]//Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997.
  • 7Meyer M, Vickers J. Performance comparison and dynamic incentive[J]. Journal of Poliiical Economy, 1997,105 (3) : 547.
  • 8[4]Singh N.Monitoring and hierarchies:the marginal value of information in a principal-agent model[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,(3):599 -609
  • 9[5]Joseph Kissan,Thevaranjian Ales.Monitoring and incentives in sales organizations:an agency theoretic perspective[J].Marketing Science,1998,17(2):107-123
  • 10[7]Bamberg G.,Spreman K.Implications of constant risk aversion[J].Operation Research,1981(25):205-224

共引文献44

同被引文献67

引证文献7

二级引证文献17

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部