摘要
运用进化博弈理论建立了食品监察部门与食品生产企业之间的非对称博弈模型,并且对建立的复制动态方程的局部稳定性进行了分析,得到了食品监察部门与食品生产企业决策行为的演化条件,在此基础上提出了关于食品安全的相关建议.
Based on evolutionary game theory,the asymmetric game model of the supervisory departments and food production enterprise is established.The local stability of the replication dynamic equations is analyzed and obtains the evolutionary condition of the behavior selection in decision-making of the supervisory departments and food production enterprise,and some suggestions of food safety are given.
出处
《重庆文理学院学报（自然科学版）》
2011年第1期13-16,共4页
Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences
关键词
食品安全
监管部门
进化博弈
food safety
supervision department
evolutionary game
