摘要
本文通过构建分段的双边市场理论模型,利用二阶段动态博弈,分类论证电子商务平台是否拥有用户信息的4种情况,以此分析用户偏好信息质量的高低对电子商务平台的市场份额、定价策略和利润水平的影响效应。研究表明:在对称性电子商务平台环境下,完全无信息时平台实行统一定价,不完全信息下实行三级价格歧视,且随信息质量的变化,平台利润呈现U型特征。在满足一定条件下,两平台都选择获取用户信息作为唯一的纳什均衡。
By constructing the theoretical model of the segmented two-sided market and using the two-stage dynamic game,this article gives a classified demonstration of the 4 cases of whether the electronic commerce platform possesses user information so as to analyze the influence of the quality of user preference information on the market share,pricing strategies and profit level of the electronic commerce platform.The research shows that in the symmetric electronic commerce platform environment,the platform performs unified price when there is no information at all,and performs a third class price discrimination when the information is incomplete.With the change of the quality of information,the profit of the platform exhibits a U-shaped character.When certain conditions are satisfied,both platforms choose the acquisition of user information as the only Nash equilibrium.
出处
《情报理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第7期76-79,共4页
Information Studies:Theory & Application
关键词
信息质量
电子商务
市场
竞争策略
quality of information
electronic commerce
market
competitive strategy