摘要
本文基于地方政府行为的视角,分析廉租房供给不足的事实与根源。研究认为,中国特殊的财政集权体制和政治激励机制对地方政府行为施加的约束与限制,决定了地方政府廉租房的供给偏好和供给效率。因此,增加廉租房的有效供给,应该深化改革体制性因素,改变地方政府廉租房供给行为的环境和模式。
Based on the perspective of local government' s behavior, this article analyzes the facts and roots of insufficient supply of low - rent housing. The research finds that the constraints and limitations of China' s special centralized fiscal system and political incentives mechanism on local government's behavior determine supply the preference and efficiency of local government's low - rent housing. As a result, for sufficient supply of low - rent housing, it is necessary to deepen the reform of institutional factors and change the environment and pattern of the supply behavior of local government' s low - rent housing.
出处
《经济学家》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第8期27-35,共9页
Economist
基金
作者主持的国家社科基金资助项目(06BJL016)"马克思土地资本化理论与转型期我国房地产经济虚拟性研究"的阶段性成果
关键词
廉租房
典型事实
财政集权
政绩考评机制
Low - rent housing
Stylized facts
Centralized fiscal system
Performance evaluation mechanism