信息不透明、分析师关注与个股暴跌风险

Information Opacity,Analysts Following and Crash Risk

本文以我国A股公司为研究样本,考察了公司信息透明度与个股暴跌风险之间的内在关系,以及证券分析师关注程度对这种关系的影响。研究结果显示,上市公司的信息透明度越低,其个股发生暴跌的风险越大。进一步的研究发现,旨在加强信息披露监管的新法规的出台,并没有显著减弱信息不透明的负面影响。在我国投资者法律保护环境尚不理想的情况下,证券分析师作为一种有效的法律外替代机制,其对股票的关注大大降低了信息不透明对个股暴跌风险的影响。本研究不仅有助于理解我国股市个股暴跌频繁背后的深层次原因,同时也为监管部门思考如何进行符合中国国情的市场透明度建设提供决策参考。

With the Chinese listed firms as the samples, this paper studies the relation between the information opacity of different firms and their crash risk. It is found that opaque firms are more prone to stock price crashes. However, the passage of laws which aimed at enhancing supervision on information disclosure hasn＇t significantly weakened the negative impact of information opacity. Moreover, the attentions of analysts to stocks who act as an effective mechanism substituted legislations substantially reduce the influence of information opacity on crash risk. This research not only contribute to the understanding of the underlying reasons of Stock price crashes, but also provide helpful references for authorities in making decisions on how to construct market transparency.