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公共机构出卖客户个人信息行为的监管博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of supervision strategy for the behavior of public institutions leaking customers' information
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摘要 近年来,公共机构屡屡出卖客户个人信息,给客户带来了严重的损失。基于公共机构出卖客户个人信息行为的监管是一项复杂的系统工程,本文运用博弈论的方法,建立了公共机构出卖客户个人信息行为的监管模型,提出了监管的混合策略,给出其纳什均衡解及经济意义,并在分析基础上提出了出卖行为的监管对策。对公共机构出卖行为的治理需多方的共同努力,在加大对监管人员失职行为处罚力度的同时,建立健全的法律保护体系,也要加强客户对个人信息的自我保护意识。 So many public institutions have leaked customers' information in resent years, bringing about losses to customers. The supervision strategy for the behavior of public institutions leaking customers' information is a complicated system project. Evolution game theory is adopted to build the model of supervision. This paper gives the mixed regulatory strategy. What's more, the Nash equilibrium solution and its economic significance are also shown in it. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to supervise those actions, insisting that the success of the supervision of the behavior of public institutions needs the efforts of all. we should not only increase the degree of publishment and establish a sound law protection system,but also strengthen customers' self-protection consciousness of personal information.
作者 苏瑾 周健勇
出处 《科技与管理》 2011年第5期60-63,共4页 Science-Technology and Management
关键词 公共机构 个人信息 监管 博弈 public institution information supervision evolutionary game
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