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建筑业招投标中“平均价中标”的实验研究 被引量:1

An Experimental Study on Average-price-win Auction:the Tradeoff between Avoiding Winner's Curse and Cutting Price
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摘要 本文通过实验室实验研究私人独立价值(IPV)假定和共同价值(CV)假定下平均价中标的拍卖。无投标限价时,IPV拍卖的报价迅速收敛至前期平均价,而CV拍卖的报价并未有明显的收敛趋势。有投标限价时,CV拍卖的报价均收敛于投标限价,报价的波动几乎与投标限价的起伏重合,而IPV拍卖的报价却没有随投标限价的起伏而有大幅的波动,仍收敛至前期的平均价格。IPV拍卖的平均报价或中标价格和中标企业的成本没有很大的联系,平均价中标几乎不能配置资源至成本最低的企业。无投标限价CV拍卖虽然避免了"赢家诅咒"问题,但报价普遍偏高;而设立较低的投标限价虽可能降低价格,但和最低价中标拍卖一样,不可避免遭遇"赢家诅咒"问题,同时投标限价很容易成为竞拍者协调报价的共同信息。 Under independent private value (IPV) and common value (CV) paradigm , this paper inves- tigates the bidding behaviors in average - price - win auctions. Without Reservation prices, bids converge quickly to previous bid - averages in IPV auctions but don' t show obvious convergence in CV auctions. With reservations, bids converge to reservations quite fast in CV auctions and the bid -averages catch the changes of reservation while the bid - averages are quite close despite the large changes of reservation in IPV auctions. In IPV, average -price -win auctions cannot allocate projects to the bid with lowest cost and is an inefficient mechanism. Winner' s Curse is avoided in CV auctions without reservations. CV auctions with low reserva- tions encounter Winner' s Curse problem. Average - price - win auction can avoid Winner' s Curse prob- lems in risk of raising winning bids and procurement cost. Low reservation prices can reduce winning bids but cannot eliminate winner' s curse.
出处 《产经评论》 2011年第6期52-63,共12页 Industrial Economic Review
关键词 建筑 采购招标 报价平均方法 平均价中标实验 construction procurement auction bid - average - methods average - price - win experi-ments
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