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地区竞争、体制扭曲与产能过剩的形成机理 被引量:478

Mechanism of Excess Capacity Based on China's Regional Competition and Market Distortion
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摘要 中国的财政分权体制和以考核GDP增长为核心的政府官员政治晋升体制,使得地方政府具有强烈的动机干预企业投资和利用各种优惠政策招商引资;土地的模糊产权、环境保护体制上的严重缺陷和金融机构的软约束问题,使得低价出让工业土地、牺牲环境和帮助企业获取金融资源成为地方政府竞争资本流入的重要手段。体制扭曲背景下,地区对于投资的补贴性竞争才是导致产能过剩最为重要的原因。本文进一步建立模型详细说明:地方政府低价供地等所导致的补贴效应,地方政府低价供地以及协调配套贷款等行为的影响下,企业自有投资过低所导致的严重风险外部化效应,扭曲了企业的投资行为,导致企业过度的产能投资、行业产能过剩。本文研究表明,从根本上解决产能过剩问题,需要在土地产权、环境保护体制、金融体制、财政体制等方面进一步推进改革。 This paper focuses on how the defect of China's economy system and the unhealthy competition of local governments lead to the formation of redundant construction and excess capacity: China's fiscal decentralization and the political promotion system between local officials based on the growth of GDP lead to the intensive competition of capital inflow, resulting in strong motive forces of local governments for intervening enterprises' investment and issuing many preferential policies. Defined ambiguously property rights of land, the serious defect of environment protection and the problem of the soft-restricted of financial institution make room for local governments to undersell industry land,to sacrifice environment intending to provide help for enterprises to obtain financial resources, which plays important roles in competitions. The effects caused by local governments' behavior mentioned above is the result of the local government's behavior of underselling land so as to support loan, to distort enterprises' investment behavior, which leads to excess investment capacity, redundant construction and excess capacity. For the purpose of settling these problems, we should promote reformation in the field of land property right, environment protection mechanism, financial system, and the promotion system of local officials.
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第6期44-56,共13页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金重点项目“转轨体制下中国工业产能过剩、重复建设形成机理与治理政策研究”(批准号09AZD017) 国家社会科学基金重点项目“产能过剩治理与投融资体制改革研究”(批准号09AJY002) 国家社会科学基金重大招标项目“新型工业化道路与推进工业结构优化升级”(批准号06&ZD002) 教育部基地重大项目“金融创新、资本市场与区域经济增长”(批准号10JJD790027)
关键词 产能过剩 投资补贴 成本外部化 风险外部化 excess capacity investment subsidy cost externalization risk externalization
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