阶梯式的渐进制度变迁模型——再论地方政府在我国制度变迁中的作用

A Model of Stepwise Gradual Institutional Changes ——A Re-discuss of Local Governments' Functions in Institutional Changes of China

本文采取个体主义的成本—收益分析法 ,并利用博弈论的思想 ,分析中国渐进制度变迁路径的一些特征 ,重点研究在向市场经济的过渡过程中中央治国者、地方政府官员和微观主体之间的三方博弈过程及其经济后果 ,力图证明正是由于地方政府的介入才使渐进式改革得以相对平稳地推进 ,并且能以较低的摩擦成本加快我国的市场化进程 ,从而使得我国的制度变迁路径呈现出阶梯状。

This paper adopts an individual cost benefit analytical method and basic ideas of the Game theory in order to analyze some characteristics of Chinese gradual institutional changes,especially the important roles played by local governments.We focus our research on,during China's transition to a market oriented economy,the trilateral game process among central rulers,subnational governors and microeconomic entities,and on its economic results.We try to prove that the comparatively smooth progress of China's gradual reform and China's rapid market oriented transition at lower friction costs are secured by the subnational governments involved,and this renders China's institutional changes to take a stepwise path.