客体化行为与非客体化行为的奠基关系再论——从儒家心学与现象学的角度看“未发”与“已发”的关系

A New View of the Relationship of Founding between Objectivating Act and Non-objectivating Act:On the Relationship of“Emotion shown”and“Emotion latent”from the Perspectives of Confucian Xin-xue and Phenomenology

近年来，笔者在现象学与唯识学关于客体化行为与非客体化行为关系的讨论方面，曾做过初步思考。（参见倪梁康，2008年，第80一87页）最近在翻译耿宁《人生第一等事——王阳明及其后学论“致良知”》一书时，受其讨论的心性现象学诸问题之启示，试图对该书中相关论述的脉络做一大致的梳理和可能的补充，同时也尝试着继续在客体化行为与非客体化行为关系的标题下做另一方向的展开，即发掘和探讨在儒家心学中蕴含的对意识结构的分析把握与在心识发生方面的解释说明。

Both Chu Hsi and School of Wang Yang-ming distinguished two kinds of moral consciousness:one is 'Emotion latent' as non-objective,un-objective moral consciousness;the other is'Emotion shown' as intentional moral consciousness which intends concrete object.Accordingly,they also pointed out two kinds of different Kung-fu(practice).As for the questions of 'Emotions shown or latent',both of them have common ontological understand and Kung-fu' understand.'Emotion latent'(as pro-objectivating act) and 'Emotion shown'(as post-objectivating act) are two kinds of 'non-objectivating act',they have different foundational relations with objectivating act.Thus,the relations between objectivating act and non-objectivating act in the background of Phenomenology achieve a completely new interpretation in the horizon of the doctrine of Mind of Confucianism.