摘要
本文给出一次n人囚徒困境的一个一般概念和一个一次n人双行动博弈(和n人对称双行动博弈)是囚徒困境的充要条件,证明了全体参与人都背叛是一次囚徒困境的唯一纯Nash均衡和唯一的期望均衡。给出了两种特殊形式的一次囚徒困境的充分条件。引进了惩罚函数和背叛愿意度等概念.研究表明,背叛愿意度这个概念包容了直观认识并能定量地解决直观上不能解决的问题。
In this paper,we give a general concept of an n-person one-shot prisoner ＇s dilemma and a necessary and sufficient condition for an n-person double action game（resp.n-person symmetrical double action game）is an n-person one-shot prisoner ＇s dilemma.It is proven that every player taking defection to be the unique pure Nash equilibrium and the unique expected equilibrium.Sufficient conditions for two special n-person one-shot prisoner ＇s dilemmas are given.The concepts of a player ＇s punishment function and preferring defection degree（PDD）are introduced.The research result shows that the concept PDD contains our intuitive understanding and can solve quantitatively problems that can not be solved by intuitive thinking.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第5期102-106,共5页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871051)
关键词
运筹学
抱团性
惩罚函数
一次n人囚徒困境
背叛愿意度
OR
cooperation
punishment function
one-shot n person prisoner ＇s dilemma
preferring defection degree（PDD）
