广西基础教育投资地区差异及影响机制研究——基于14个地级市的实证检验

Study on the Differences of Local Education Investment in Guangxi and Influence Mechanism——An Empirical Research on 14 Prefectural-Level Cities

中国式财政分权体制下,地方政府对教育投资的激励既来自于纳税人自下而上的公共需求,更来自上级政府的行政压力。通过对影响教育投资的因素进行实证检验后,发现地方转移支付相对于地方自有收入对地方教育投资有更强的激励,均等化转移支付规模不断扩大的情况下,落后地区获得均等化转移支付的规模和增速相对更大、更快,在一定程度上弥补了由于地方自有收入规模差异扩大所造成的教育投资差距的变化。

The incentive of local government education investment comes not only from taxpayer＇s common demand, but also from administrative pressure of higher level government in Chinese style fiscal decentralization system. The study finds that the incentive effect of fiscal transfer payment on local education investment was greater than that of the local revenue. With the expanding of equalization transfer payment, the scale and growth rate of transfer payment to underdeveloped areas grew greater and faster, which filled the gap of education investment resulted from different amount of revenue of local governments.