创业板上市公司负债融资与过度投资的相互关系

The Research on Interplay Between Debt-financing and Over-investment Based on the Data from Listed Companies on GEM

本文以中国创业板公司为研究对象,依据企业代理理论,采用联立方程组模型研究了创业板公司在非效率投资和风险特征背景下过度投资与负债融资之间的双向关系。实证结果表明,过度投资增加了企业的负债融资,而负债的增加又对企业过度投资起到了抑制作用。本文的研究为规范创业板企业投资行为,完善企业内部治理与外部债权人治理机制,优化企业融资结构等提供了理论依据。

With simultaneous equations model, this paper studies the interplay between debt - financing and over - in- vestment based on agency theory and the data from listed companies on GEM in the context of non - efficient investment and risk characteristics. The empirical results show that the over - investment increases enterprise＇s debt financing, while an increasing new debt - financing restrains the enterprise＇s over - investment. The paper can be regarded as an important theoretical basis for regulating the investment behavior of listed companies on GME,improving the internal corporate gov- ernance and external creditors governance,optimizing the structure of corporate finance.