房地产寡头有限理性博弈模型的复杂性分析

Complex dynamic analysis for a real-estate oligopoly game model with bounded rationality

根据区域房地产行业的成本结构特点,基于政府地价控制行为建立有限理性房地产寡头动态Coumot模型,并分别用理论和数字模拟的方法对其复杂性加以分析.结果表明,区域房地产寡头完全静态博弈Nash均衡在现实中是通过有限理性、不完全信息动态重复博弈达成的;在房产开发商生产技术和管理水平一定下,政府对地价的控制决定区域房地产寡头动态博弈均衡的性质和路径,从而决定房地产开发市场的类型和均衡稳定性.

According to the cost structural of the regional real-estate industry, the authors rebuilt the dynamic Cournot game model of real-estate oligopolies with bounded rationality, based on the regional governmental act of land price controlling. The authors studied the complexity of the model through theoretical analysis and simulation. The results show that the Nash equilibrium of the perfect static game between the real-estate oligopolies shall achieve through repetitive dynamic game with bounded rationality, on condition of imperfect information. When the production technology and management skills are given, the type and the path of the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game between the real-estate oligopolies are determined by the regional governmental act of land price controlling. Thus the type and equilibrium stability of the regional real-estate market are determined by it as well.