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经评审最低价中标法及投标人行为研究 被引量:5

Research on Appraised First-price Auction and Bidder Behavior:the Case of Xiamen City
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摘要 评标方法是确定中标人的准则,是招标机制的核心。回顾厦门市评标方法的发展,重点研究厦门市2009年公布的经评审最低投标价中标法,然后基于此评标方法研究投标人的报价和合谋行为。研究结果表明,厦门市2009版的经评审最低投标价法已不属于最低价中标法,而是平均价中标法的一种。利用该评标方法确定中标人具有很大的随机性,投标人为增大中标概率将采取更普遍的合谋行为。 The bid evaluation method determines the winning bidder and it's the core of the procurement auction. This paper first reviews the development of bid evaluation method in Xiamen, focusing on the appraised lowest- price tendering published in 2009, and then studies the tender offer and collusive behavior based on this bid eval- uation method. The results shows that the 2009th edition appraised lowest-price in Xiamen is belong to the aver- age-bid method, does not belong to the lowest-price tendering. It's random that the winning bidder determined by this bid evaluation, and the bidder's collusion is more widespread for increasing the probability of winning the bid.
作者 章凌云
出处 《建筑经济》 北大核心 2013年第8期55-58,共4页 Construction Economy
基金 华侨大学科研项目(08HZR10)
关键词 建筑工程 经评审最低价中标法 投标人行为 合谋 construction engineering appraised lowest-price tendering bidders behavior collusion
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