房产商与地方政府有限理性博弈模型的复杂性分析

An Analysis on the Dynamic Complexity of the Game between Government and Real Estate Developers with Bounded Rationality

基于地方政府地价控制行为和有限理性建立房产商和政府动态博弈模型,并分别用理论和数字模拟的方法对其复杂性加以分析,结果表明:区域地价和房价、房屋产销量博弈的Nash均衡在现实中是通过有限理性、不完全信息动态重复博弈达成的;若政府采取固定比率紧盯房价的模式管理地价,则政府对地价的控制决策决定区域房价均衡水平;均衡时,区域楼面地价与房价的比率是恒定的,且地价对房价的调整比率应小于最高地价房价比的2倍;政府税收和房产商建设成本制约地价调整并影响房产行业的产销量和价格,而区域政府可以通过延时反馈机制调控土地和房产市场。

The dynamic game model between government and real estate developers is built with bounded rationality, based on the regional governmental act of land price controlling . The complexity of the model is tested through theoretical analysis and simulation. The results show that the Nash equilibrium of the game of regional land price, house price and production and sales quantity of houses shall achieve through repetitive dynamic game with bounded rationality, on condition of imperfect information. When regional government supervises and controls the land price by the way of keeping a close eye on house price with fixed ratio, the equilibrium price of re- gional house will be determined by the land price control decisions of the government. And the ratio of land price per floor area to house price will be constant if the land market and house mar- ket are both equilibrium, thus the adjustment ratio of land price to house price should be no more than 2 times of the ratio of max land price to the max house price. The real-estate construction cost and the governmental tax on developing both restrict the land price adjustment and affect production and sales quantityand prices of the real estate industry, but the regional government can realize regulation and controlling of the land market and real--estate market by DFC （Delay Feedback Control）.