公有制企业的性质

The Nature of Publicly owned Enterprise

本文概述尚未发生市场化改革的公有制企业的性质。这就是 ,在法权上否认个人拥有生产性资源产权的基础上 ,公有制企业成为非市场合约性的组织。但是为了充分动员在事实上仍然属于个人的人力资本 ,公有制企业用国家租金激励机制来替代市场交易和利润激励体制。本文比较了国家租金体制与市场合约的企业体制的差别 ,认为这是理解公有制企业与非公有制企业效率差别的基础。在方法论上 ,本文认为流行的“委托—代理”框架和“所有权经营权分离”框架都不适合分析公有制企业的经济性质 ,因而尝试运用“法权的和事实的产权不相一致”的框架。

This paper proposes a theory that explains the nature of human capital ownership in the POEs,and argues that the institutional separation of de facto and de jure ownership of human capital from their owners is at the heart of the POE inefficiency.This institutional incompatibility has led to widespread phenomena of individuals using their de facto owned human capital to “capture” the benefits generated by the physical capital nominally owned by the state or the collective.Consequently,partial reforms that only introduce an efficient goods market and/or give managers more decision making power will inevitably exacerbate this problem,since the newly established market now provides a place for individuals,especially managers,to sell the captured profits and assets.The success of the POE reform,therefore,hinges not only on establishing well defined de facto control of physical capital by managers,but also on giving the de jure rights of human capital back to the de facto owners who have never been missing even during the former central planned era.