摘要
本文采用人人贷平台自成立以来的大数据样本,从实证角度研究行业监管的有效性。本文的研究表明:①整体而言,政策监管是有效的,既提高了项目借款成功率又降低了项目违约率,但监管效果与项目利率相关,监管后项目借款成功率和违约率均随着利率的提高而提高;②基于多次借款者历史记录的分类研究发现,监管对曾至少失败一次的借款者的项目有效,但对曾至少成功一次的借款者的项目无效;③随着利率升高,政策监管降低项目违约率的效果在减弱,且各类项目利率在12.01%~13.97%及以上时,监管对违约率的影响不再存在。本文实证结果对于不同利率分组、不同借款金额和不同的样本区间是稳健的。最后,本文根据研究结论对进一步完善行业监管与平台管理提出了参考建议。
During the past several years,China has gradually introduced series of clauses to regulate the rapid development of the P2P industry.In this paper,we use the large sample data of Renren Lending to study the effeciency of these industry regulations.We find that based on the whole data,the regulatory policy improves the success rate of loans,reduces the default rate,and the efficiency is related to the interest rate.After supervision,as the interestrates increase;the success rate also increase while the default rate arises as well.We classify the data into two subgroups which are one-time borrowers and multiple-time borrowerss.Our results show that the regulation effect is decreasing as interest rate is higher.But for the borrowers with multiple times lending and at least having succeeded once,the regulations have lowered the success rate and the effect on default rate is not significant.While for the borrowers with multiple times lending and at least having failed one time,the regulations have higher the success rate and lower the default rate. As for the default risk,the regulation effect no longer exists when the interest rate is higher enough,especially for the borrowers with multiple times lending and at least having failed one time. These results are robust to different subgroups with different interest rates,different loan amounts and different sample intervals.
作者
徐淑一
彭玉磊
王奕倩
Xu Shuyi;Peng Yulei;Wang Yiqian
出处
《金融学季刊》
CSSCI
2018年第4期21-68,共48页
Quarterly Journal of Finance
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473278、71573288)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71503280)
广东省自然科学基金(2017A030310548)
广东省创新团队项目(2016WCXTD001)
广东省省级科技计划项目(2015A070705007)