摘要
针对近年来GI农产品质量安全事故频发的现状,文章在界定GI农产品加工企业为质量控制关键环节的基础上,从集体声誉视角出发,采用演化博弈模型对GI农产品加工企业的质量标准采纳行为进行了分析。结果表明,影响加工企业质量标准采纳的因素为企业资源投入量、标准化的溢出系数、企业群规模总量、搭便车行为的发现概率以及对搭便车者实施惩罚的成本等。通过模型参数分析,提出控制企业群规模、严格使用权审核制度等政策建议与启示。
In recent years quality safety accidents of GI agricultural products are frequent. On the basis of discussing the importance of GI agricultm'al product processing enterprises, from the perspective of collective reputation, this paper uses evolutionary game model to analyze the behaviors of adopting standards on processing enterprises. The results show that the factors which effect the adoption of standards in geographical indications processing enterprises are the input resource of enforprises, the spillover coefficient of standardization, the number of processing enterprises, the detection probability of freeriding behavior and the punishment cost of free-riding behavior. Finally , this paper proposes the policy suggestions which include controlling the quantity of processing enterprises and the supervision of the right to use on the audit system and so on.
出处
《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期296-299,共4页
Journal of Tianjin University:Social Sciences
基金
教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(10YJA630014)
关键词
GI农产品
加工型企业
标准采纳
演化博弈
geographical indications agricultural products
processing enterprises
standards adoption
evolutionary game