灌区农户合作行为的博弈分析

Game-theoretic Analyses of Farmers' Co-operative Behaviour in Irrigation District

本文首先给出灌区农户合作行为经济模型 ,并据此给出农户灌区管理服务供给的纳 什均衡解。由此说明 :作为理性的经济行为人 ,一个人预期其他人提供的公共物品越多 , 他自己的供给就越少 ;灌区内农户相互协作的责任是以其他人的行为预期为条件的。影 响灌区农户合作行为的内生因素为农户收入水平和农户所处的地理位置 ,外生因素则为 私人物品和公共物品消费的相对重要性以及公共物品价格。为促进农户灌区管理合作行 为 ,政府应该在补偿机制、合作规则的建立以及政策扶持方面发挥重要作用。

Due to the characteristics of natural monopoly and asset speciality in water production, an irrigation district is a kind of common-pool resource. How the conflict should be resolved between individual rationality and collective rationality in the exploitation of water resource? What factors hinder the outcome of farmers' co-operation? Using the game theory, the paper analyses on these questions, and points out that in order to facilitate the farmers' co-operative behaviour in irrigation district management, the government should play an important role in the establishment of compensating mechanism, collective rules and supporting policy.