地方财政收入预决算偏离:晋升激励与税收任务

Political Incentive,Tax Plan and the Budget Revenue Forecast Error of Local Government

基于1997年~2012年省际平衡面板数据研究晋升激励与税收任务对地方财政收入预决算偏离的影响,利用地税局本科以上人数作为税收任务的工具变量以解决税收任务内生性问题。地方官员在晋升激励下对预算编制依据GDP增长率与政绩考核指标GDP实际增长率采取策略性态度,GDP超计划增长为地方政府追求财政超收奠定了经济基础;税务部门在税收任务刚性考核压力下会提高税收努力程度,税收任务与预决算偏离之间呈现正相关性。

Based on the provincial panel data from 1997 to 2012,this paper examines the influence of promotion incentive and tax plan on the budget revenue forecast error of local government,and uses the total people of tax departments with bachelor degree as the instrumental variable in order to solve the endogenous problem of tax plan. It concludes that： firstly,the local officials under the promotion incentive have the motive to impact the GDP-Plan growth as well as the actual GDP growth strategically,and the GDP-ExceedingPlan lays the foundation for public revenue. Secondly,under the pressure of tax-plan,the tax departments have to strengthen tax collection,and the relationship between tax-plan and revenue forecast error shows a positive correlation.