中国地方财政体制演变的逻辑与转型

The Evolutionary Logic and Reform of China's Local Fiscal System

本文在经济转型的大背景下系统考察了改革开放以来中国财税体制的演变。1980年代的分权式"财政承包制"是中国特定转轨路径的内生结果,而非该阶段高速增长的主要制度基础;1990年代后期逐步兴起的区域招商引资竞争、"土地财政"、"土地金融"只是1994年集权式分税制改革在中国特定金融、土地、劳工、环保体制组合下的一个非预期后果。在带来高增长的同时,这种地方发展主义模式开始带来日益增加的经济、金融扭曲及不可持续的社会、环境后果。与其他体制一起,分税制不仅加大了地方对上级转移支付的依赖与预算软约束,也推动地方财政日益成为"吃饭财政"与"建设财政",而与政府建设"公共财政"的目标渐行渐远。未来改革应从市场化地方债发行入手抑制"建设财政",并逐步化解地方债务风险,以土地改革调整地方政府获取土地增值收益的模式,以"营改增"为抓手实现财政分权,并通过缩小专项转移支付和强化公共服务标准设定、监督来诱导地方政府提供基本公共服务,逐步实现向公共财政的有效转型。

This article reviews the institutional change of China's local fiscal system in the context ofthe economic transition since the late 1970 s. We argue that'fiscal contracting system'inthe 1980 s was endogenous to China's specific transitional path, rather than an institutionalfoundation of economic growth. Regional competition for investment and the'land finance'since the late 1990 s was an unintended consequence of the tax-sharing reform in thecontext of China's specific fiscal, land, labor, and environmental protection system. Therace to bottom competition in the past two decades has led to strong growth as well asserious economic distortions and unsustainable social and environmental outcomes. What'smore, local governments have been increasingly dependent on central fiscal transfers andthe issue of serious soft budget constraints begins to stand out. China's local governmentbudget is more like an'eating budget'and a'construction budget'rather than a budgetthat targets public service to local constituency. China needs to set up a moremarket-oriented local government bond system to reduce the financial risks from localgovernment debt. A land reform is also needed to adjust the distribution of land valueappreciation. Moreover, a reform to levy value-added tax rather than business tax on servicecould help promote fiscal decentralization. The Chinese government should rely more ongeneral transfers rather than earmarked transfers to induce local governments to providebasic public services.