基于用户预算和服务质量的动态频谱接入

Dynamic spectrum access based on budget and quality of service

在动态频谱接入网络中,如何通过频谱地图有效地获得频谱的使用是一个亟待解决的问题。目前主要通过频谱运营商将可用频段销售给用户的方式实现频谱接入。针对用户的实际支付能力和服务质量(QoS)需求不同,提出联合预算和功率控制方案。将运营商和用户建模成两阶段的Stackelberg博弈模型,运营商根据用户的预算和QoS需求动态调整频谱价格,用户根据频谱价格改变自己的需求,最后证明了用户和运营商最大收益的纳什均衡解的存在性和唯一性。仿真结果表明:在多次交换信息后,用户预算的总和是整个网络收益的上限,用户和运营商均能获得最大收益且达到纳什均衡。

In the dynamic spectrum access network,how to utilize the spectrum resource efficiently is a vital problem to be solved. Presently,the main study focuses on the scenario that spectrum providers lease spectrum to users for spectrum access. Considering the issue that the user＇s actual payment capacity and Quality of Service（ QoS） demands were different,a joint budget and power control scheme was proposed,the interactions among spectrum providers and users were investigated as a two-stage Stackelberg game model. Based on the budget and QoS demands,providers dynamically adjusted spectrum leasing prices,and users adjusted their demands according to the prices. Finally,the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium（ NE） of maximum profit of users and providers was proved. Simulation results show that the sum of budget of users is the upper bound of the whole network payoff,users and providers can get the optimal profit and achieve the Nash Equilibrium（ NE）.