多任务目标视角下PPP项目激励问题与模型构建

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Public Private Partnerships Based on Multi-task Principal Agent Theory

针对PPP项目中投资方任务目标的多维性,研究了政府方激励机制的设计问题。研究发现,当投资方的成本函数相互独立时,政府方的激励也是独立的;而当投资方的成本函数相互依存时,政府方的激励方式取决于投资方的行为结果是否可以直接观测。若投资方的行为结果是不可观测的,那么政府方对于该行为的激励是独立的;若投资方的行为结果是可直接观测的,则政府方对于该行为的激励方式取决于该行为的成本函数与不可观测的行为活动的成本函数之间的依存关系。

This paper demonstrates how the incentive mechanism is made by government when the investor engaged in several tasks based on multi-task principal-agent. Result shows that the relevance of the investor＇s cost function has great effect on the incentive mechanism. If the result of the investor＇s behavior is unobservable, then the incentive mechanism is not related to cost. However, if the result of the investor＇s behavior is observable, the incentive mechanism should dependent on the re- lationship among cost functions.