摘要
可再生能源并网发电投资决策不仅受到技术、成本、政策等不确定因素的影响,相同和不同可再生能源电力技术间的竞争关系将对决策施加重要影响。针对两种不同可再生能源电力技术,构建投资时机选择期权博弈模型并分析可再生能源并网发电投资决策特征。结果表明,电网对两种可再生能源电力的收购歧视度将决定可再生能源双寡头企业在投资时机选择博弈中的均衡类型。一定参数条件下,电网收购歧视度呈由小到大变化时,博弈所产生的均衡类型相应地表现为同时投资均衡、占先均衡和顺序投资均衡。
Investment decision about grid-connected renewable energy is not only affected by technology, cost, policy and other uncertain factors, but also greatly influenced by the competitive relation between same and different electric technologies of renewable energy. For two kinds of different electric technologies of renewable energy, the mode of option game in choosing the investment timing shall be constructed and the features of investment decision about grid-connected renewable energy shall be analyzed. The results show that the discrimination of power grid on the acquisition of two kinds of renewable electric power will decide the equilibrium types of duopoly companies of renewable energy in the game of choosing the investment timing. With certain parameters, the discrimination of the acquisition of power grid grows from small to big while the equilibrium types produced in the game are correspondingly the simultaneous investment equilibrium, the preemption equilibrium, and the sequential investment equilibrium.
出处
《电子科技大学学报(社科版)》
2016年第3期35-41,106,共8页
Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"可再生能源电价机制形成机理研究"(71473031)
关键词
可再生能源并网发电
期权博弈
电网收购歧视度
博弈均衡
grid-connected renewable energy
option game
discrimination of the acquisition of power grid
game equilibrium