摘要
伴随着金融市场的发展和公司理论研究的深入,股东同质化假设正从多个维度被股东异质化现实所推翻。股东异质化突出表现为股东的利益、目的和能力的不同。正是出于对股东异质化的认识,域外国家提供了包括双层股权结构在内的其他股权结构形式。在我国,一股一权与股东异质化的结合导致了股东偏好满足成本过高、治理低效、股东与公司利益偏离等问题。双层股权通过灵活的股权配置与股东异质化需求实现了某种程度的契合,合理地引入双层股权不仅可以软化僵硬的股权结构,而且可以对股东异质化现实给予有效的回应。
With the development of financial market and the penetration into corporate theory,the shareholder heterogeneity hypothesis is being overturned by the reality of shareholder heterogeneity in various dimensions. The distinct characteristics of shareholder heterogeneity are the differences on shareholders' interests,purposes and abilities. Because of the cognition on shareholder heterogeneity,foreign countries provide other equity structure forms including dual- class equity structure. In China,the combination of one share-one vote and shareholder heterogeneity resulted in problems such as the high cost in meeting shareholders' preferences,the inefficiency in governance and the deviation between shareholders' interests and corporate interests. Dual- class equity structure achieved correspondence to some extent through flexible equity distribution and the demand of shareholder heterogeneity. The reasonable introduction of dual- class equity structure could not only soften the stiff equity structure,but could also respond to the reality of shareholder heterogeneity effectively.
出处
《政法论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期126-137,共12页
Tribune of Political Science and Law
基金
教育部2014年重大攻关项目(项目批准号:14J2D008)的成果
关键词
投票权
股东同质化
股东异质化
一股一权
双层股权
Voting Rights
Shareholder Homogeneity
Shareholder Heterogeneity
One Share-One Vote Structure
Dual Class Equity Structure