意欲现象学的开端与发展——普凡德尔与胡塞尔的共同尝试

The Start and Progression of the Phenomenology of Will—The Common Attempt of Pf?nder and Husserl

亚历山大·普凡德尔(A.Pf?nder)和舍勒一样,都可以主张自己是现象学运动的共同发起人。如果在胡塞尔那里得到展开的主要是认知现象学或知性现象学,那么舍勒所思考的就主要是情感现象学或感受现象学,而普凡德尔则从一开始所指向的就是意欲现象学或意志现象学。意欲现象学研究的一个重要特点在于:在意欲分析中蕴涵着对意识的结构研究和发生研究两方面的可能性,而且因此也进一步蕴涵着对从理论意向性到实践意向性,或者也可以说,从实践意向性到理论意向性的意识发生研究的双重可能性。因而可以说,意欲现象学在此意义上构成整个意识现象学研究的多重意义上的起点。

Like Scheler, Alexander Prander also believes that he is the co-initiator of phenomeno- logical movement. If that which is unfolded in Husserl is cognitive or intellectual phenomenology, then what Scheler focuses on is the phenomenology of emotion or feeling, and Prander is inclined, from the very beginning, to the phenomenology of will. A weighty property of the phenomenology of will is that in the analyses of will there is embraced the twofold possibility of studying the structure as well as the genesis of consciousness, and hence there is further embraced the twofold possibility of studying the genesis of consciousness from theoretical to practical intentionality or the other way round. On this ac- count, the phenomenology of will constitutes the starting point in manifold senses of the studies of the whole consciousness phenomenology.