基于计算实验的光伏电站质量优化利益分配

Revenue-share under Quality Optimization of Solar PV Power Plant Based on Computational Experiment

针对光伏电站质量优化利益分配问题,在系统分析相关利益主体属性及博弈关系的基础上,考虑到电站质量优化存在的风险,结合主体对收益分配的公平关切及决策过程的学习性,构建了承包商和运营商参与的两主体利益分配模型。研究了仅承包商具有公平关切性、仅运营商具有公平关切性和双方均具有公平关切性三种实验情景下,系统利益分配的可行域、博弈结果及系统风险水平。实验结果表明:主体公平关切性越大,利益分配可行域越小、主体自身收益越大;运营商公平关切性越大,将导致自身收益越大而承包商收益越小,承包商增加成本投入的积极性越小,系统风险也越大;承包商公平关切性越大,将导致自身收益越大而运营商收益越小,承包商将愿意增加更多的成本投入,系统风险也随之减小。

To solve the revenue-share problem under quality optimization of PV power plant,this paper first analyzes the attribution of agents related and the game＇s relationship.Then it takes the risk of quality optimization,the fairness preference of revenue-share and the learning ability during decision making process into consideration,builds an agentbased model of contractor and operator on revenue-share.Finally we design three experimental scenarios：Only contractor has fairness preference,only operator has fairness preference,both of the two agents have fairness preference,to research the feasible region,the result and the risk of the revenue-share.The results show that the higher the fairness preference is,the smaller the feasible region of the distribution coefficient and greater revenue of the agents.If the operator gets high fairness preference,the system would give more revenue to operator and less to contractor,leading the contractor compress the cost and increase the risk of the system.If the contractor gets high fairness preference,the system would give more revenue to contractor and less to operator,leading the contractor increase the cost and decrease risk of the system.