论“善是不可定义的”——摩尔伦理学的科学化转向

On Moore's “Goodness is Indefinable” The scientized orientation of Moore's Principia Ethica

对"善是不可定义的"这一命题的论证,摩尔首先从正面立论,提出"善"的单纯性和非自然性,指出"自然主义谬误";并通过构建"开放问题论证",反证以任何自然性质给"善"下定义都是错误的,提出"善是不可定义的"。由此引起的认识论难题通过直觉主义来解决,建立非自然主义立场的价值论直觉主义,开启伦理学的理论化与科学化转向。但由于过分追求形式忽略内容,最终走向了形式主义。本文指出该论证的存疑之处,并认为应当把语言和逻辑分析方法内化到规范伦理学的研究中,把对"善"的普遍常识内化为伦理学标准,对外在的形式标准加以补充。尽管摩尔并没有完成对科学化伦理学的系统建构,但他对伦理学术语的逻辑分析方法和直觉主义的认识论立场具有深远影响。

On the proposition ＂Goodness is Indefinable＂ , Moore first put forward the simplicity and non-naturality of the ＂goodness＂ , pointing out the ＂naturalistic fallacy＂ . In addition, he further emphasized that it is incorrect to define ＂good＂ by any natural properties through the ＂open question argument＂ . The resulting epistemological problems were addressed by intuitionism, in order to realize the theoretical and scientific process of ethics. However, the theory ultimately declined to the formalism. This article points out the inadequacies in this proposition, and suggests that language and logical analysis methods should be internalize into the study of normative ethics; meanwhile, the common sense of ＂good＂ should become the ethic standard. Although Moore did not complete the systematic construction of scientific ethics, the logic analysis methods and intuitionist epistemology stance still have far-reaching influence on ethics