股票期权激励、高管解雇压力与公司风险承担

Stock Option Incentive,Executive Firing Pressure and Corporate Risk-taking

本文融合经典代理理论和行为代理理论两种理论观点,依据激励条件和行权有效期,将高管股票期权激励区分为严苛型和宽松型两类,分别研究其激励程度与公司风险承担水平之间的关系,并考察高管解雇压力对此二者关系的影响。研究结果表明:(1)严苛型高管股票期权激励程度与公司风险承担水平呈显著非线性关系,宽松型高管股票期权激励程度与公司风险承担水平呈显著线性负相关关系;(2)解雇压力滞后了严苛型高管股票期权激励程度与公司风险承担水平之间的非线性关系,并减弱了宽松型高管股票期激励程度与公司风险承担水平之间的负相关关系。

This paper integrates the classical agency theory and the behavioral agent theory and divides the performance-vested stock options into two categories： ＂severe type＂ and ＂loose type＂ by incentive conditions and the validity period of the exercise. The relationships between incentive degrees of executive stock options and corporate risk-taking of both types are studied respectively. In addition, this paper also examines the influence of firing pressure on the relationship between the two variables. The results show that, firstly, the relationship of incentive degrees of executive stock options and corporate risk-taking presents a nonlinear shape in the ＂severe type＂ group, and presents a negative correlation in the ＂loose type＂ group. Secondly, the firing pressure lags the nonlinear shape relationship between incentive degrees of executive stock options and corporate risk-taking in the ＂severe type＂ group, and weakens the negative correlation between the ＂loose type＂ of incentive degrees of executive stock options and corporate risk-taking in the ＂loose type＂ group.