工业化和城市化进程中的财税体制演进:事实、逻辑和政策选择

The Evolution of the Tax System during China's Industrialization and Urbanization:Facts,Logics and Policies

立足于工业化和城市化演进过程中的财税体制变迁,本文分析工业税制对于工业化、土地财政对于城市化的激励作用,揭示工业化和城市化不同发展阶段下工业化税收和公共服务支出的不匹配特征。通过实证分析地方政府土地经营导致的工业税收替代效应,发现土地城市化和人口城市化都显著抑制工业税收增长。在国际比较的基础上,本文归纳了财政体制转变的三个逻辑:福利支出增长导致的城市化成本刚性上升;工业税基逐步削弱的确定性与服务业税收增长的不确定性;土地财政造成的财政幻觉。基于典型事实和理论分析,本文对城市化新阶段的财税体制转型方向给出了建议。

Summary： China has an industrial tax system in which firms are the main taxpayers and the added value of taxable products is the main tax base. It is most typical in the manufacturing sector, which has the highest tax rate and the strongest performance in the whole economy after the value-added tax is extended to the service sector. Industrial taxes include the value-added tax, consumption tax, business tax and the urban maintenance and construction tax, which is levied based on a fixed rate of the value-added tax. These taxes accounted for 51% of China＇s total tax revenue in 2016. The urbanization rate in China exceeded 50% in 2011, and the manufacturing industrial proportion continues to decline. Industrial Tax growth has stagnated following this rapid decline, resulting in a decrease in the growth of tax revenue from 25% in 2011 to 4.8% in 2016. Meanwhile, the urbanization process has increased demand for public services. The long-lasting and ever- expanding fiscal gap brought about by the sustained rise in demand for public services and the slowing growth of industrial tax revenues can be solved by land sales in the short term, but three long-term challenges/contradictions arise： （ 1 ） the contradiction between the declining proportion of industrial tax and increasing demand for public services brought by urhanization, （2） the contradiction between the continued rise of the urbanization rate and the unsustainable growth of land finance, and （3） the contradiction between the imbalance of local fiscal revenue caused by urban differentiation and equal access to basic public services nationwide, which sharpens the asymmetry between regional financial risks and the overall arrangement across the country. Under the development path of bilateral tax incentives （ i. e. by boosting industrialization through industrial tax and boosting urbanization via land finance） , the growth of the two forms of government revenues, namely tax and land rent, due to the different development trends of industrialization and urbanization and local governments＇ focus on land management, displays a pattern of ＂rent substituting tax＂. In this study, we find that （1） the increase in the urbanization rate is almost synchronous with the increase in the land price. Generally, if the urbanization rate increases by 1% , the land price will increase by 6% accordingly, and （2） the promotion of urbanization, or the rise in the price of land, significantly inhibited the proportion of industrial tax. Specifically, if the land price doubles, the proportion of industrial tax in the local government tax revenue will decline by 0.87% , and the proportion of industrial tax in the local government expenditure will fall by 1.44%. Furthermore, （3） the development of land and population urbanization will not increase the tax income under the current industrial tax system. We make three propositions based on international comparison and historical experiences. Further, based on our research, we make the following policy recommendations： （1） Matching the personal tax to public service enjoyment. To this end, citizens＇ demands for public service in the pursuit of a better life can meet the principle of ＂ Do as you can＂. （2） Taxing consumption and reducing fiscal stimulus distortions caused by overconcentration on the production of the indirect tax system. （3） Holding 30% as the bottom line of the industrial proportion, as this is equally important for the robust functioning of the public sector and the ＂construction of industrial powers＂ target in 2050. （4） Establishing a national unified land market, strictly controlling the land bubble and curbing speculation on land by local governments. （5） Transforming income distribution from ＂resource rent＂ to ＂knowledge rent＂ and preventing the formation of a wealth trap.