矿山资源整合的三方博弈及其策略研究

Improved Strategy of the Triangular Game when Mining Resourse are Being Integrated

设租、寻租等投机行为是造成资源整合效率损失,进而埋下安全、环保隐患的重要原因之一。文章借助博弈论的分析工具,首先分析了中央政府、地方政府和开采企业基于资源整合监管力度的支付函数,并以此为基础对参与方同步行动时的不完全信息动态子博弈分别进行了研究,得到精炼纳什均衡策略。进而基于博弈的过程为参与方不断利用扰动进行策略调整,且博弈的结果都为采取0-1的纯策略决策,构建涉及剩余价值"扰动"的策略演进博弈模型,而使得中央政府信息劣势的不利程度得到一定程度的缓解,且策略明显得到改善。

Rent-seeking,one kind of speculative behaviors causing loss of efficiency when Mining resourse are being integrated, is one of important reasons for increasing potential risk in Mining production and environmental damages.This paper,based on the degree of resource-integrated supervision and with the tools of game theory,analyzed respectively the payment function of the central government,local government and mining enterprise as a basis for simultaneous action on the participants,and studied separately the dynamic sub-game of incomplete information,which get perfect Nash equilibrium strategies.Then the paper bulids a game model related on the disturbance of surplus value as strategies evolve,for participants make use of information disturbance continuously to adjust their strategies but their game results are in 0-1 pure strategies finally.Therefore,The adverse effect of the asymmetrical information has reduced to some degree and the Central Government's strategy has clearly been improved.