“限薪令”的政策效果：基于竞争与垄断性央企市场反应的评估

The Effect of Executive Compensation Regulation:A Study Based on Market Reactions of Competitive and Monopolistic SOEs

在新一轮国企分类改革的背景下,本文针对2014年《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》,构建模型分析了事前的薪酬管制对竞争和垄断性央企的不同效果,并进行了实证检验。研究发现:(1)"限薪令"具有实际约束力,降低了央企高管的货币薪酬与企业内部薪酬差距;(2)竞争性央企有显著负的累积异常收益,符合"干预假说",垄断性央企几乎不受影响,支持"中性假说";(3)就影响机制而言,公司治理越差、行业增长率越高、竞争越激烈、地区市场化程度越高时,公司价值的损失也越大,但这些都只存在于竞争性央企中。鉴于"限薪令"对竞争和垄断性央企不同的冲击效果,本文建议国企高管薪酬政策应遵循分类改革与精准监管的思路。

In the context of the latest reform about state - owned enterprises （ SOEs ）, focusing on the ＂Compensation reform program of central SOEs managers＂ in 2014, this paper constructs a principal - agent model under asymmetric information and examines the impact of ex ante pay limit on competitive and monopolistic central SOEs. Empirical results show that ： 1 ） The pay limit indeed reduces managers＇ monetary compensation and the gap between management and ether employees in central SOEs; 2） Competitive central SOEs have significant negative cumulative abnormal returns which is consistent with the intervening hypothesis, while monopolistic central SOEs are not affected according to the neutral hypothesis; 3 ） In terms of mechanisms, when corporate governance is weaker, industry grows faster and is more competitive, or the degree of marketization in the region is higher, pay limit leads to greater loss in firm value, but these effects only exist in competitive central SOEs. Considering the different effects on competitive and monopoly central SOEs, this paper suggests that executive compensation regulation in SOEs should follow the classification and precise supervision rules.